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THE

DANGERS

OF

PREMATURE PEACE.

WITH

CURSORY STRICTURES

ON THE

DECLARATION

OF THE

KING OF PRUSSIA,

INSCRIBED TO

WILLIAM WILBERFORCE, Esq.

By JOHN BOWLES, Esq.

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TO

WILLIAM WILBERFORCE, Eſq. M. P.

SIR,

WHEN a man of great talents and reſpectability, whoſe tongue is known to expreſs, not merely the ſuggeſtions of an enlightened mind, but the dictates of an honeſt heart; when ſuch a man withdraws his ſupport from a juſt and neceſſary war, it may be conſidered as a national misfortune—but in a war like the preſent the loſs of ſuch ſupport, is a calamity which the whole human race has occaſion to deplore. The application of theſe remarks would be ſuperfluous.

Permit me, Sir, to inſcribe to yourſelf the following reflections, which I requeſt you to conſider as a reſpectful expoſtulation, on the occaſion of your urgent and reiterated attempts to bring about a negociation with the anarchial Republic of France—Attempts, which

which coming from ſuch a character, have a lamentable tendency to impede and fruſtrate the operations of a WAR, which demands, as it deſerves, the utmoſt aid of union and energy; the principle of *which* has had, from its commencement, your decided ſanction; and of *which* it is impoſſible to ſay that it has yet attained its grand and indiſpenſable object, the production of that ſocial ſecurity, without which peace muſt be deſtitute of all ſolid foundation.

I have the honour to be,

With great Reſpect,

SIR,

Your moſt obedient Servant.

Hamſtead,
May 25, 1795.

JOHN BOWLES.

THE

DANGERS OF PREMATURE PEACE.

THE apparent influence of the French Revolution on the human mind, is neither the leaſt ſurprizing, nor the leaſt alarming of its effects. It ſeems to have a tendency not merely to diſturb all the ſocial relations, to ſubvert all order and government, and to overthrow every ancient ſyſtem and inſtitution, but alſo to turn the heads of mankind, to reverſe every ſettled principle, and to break every eſtabliſhed chain of reaſoning, to diſſolve all accuſtomed aſſociations of ideas, and to expoſe individuals to a mental while it involves the world in a political anarchy. Not only do things aſſume a new value, but they are eſtimated according to an inverſe ratio. Virtue and vice—right and duty—authority and obedience, ſeem to have exchanged places. In France the Revolution has inverted the edifice of ſociety, by levelling to the ground the lofty point, ſo neceſſary to the exerciſe of a general ſuperintendence—ſo

eſſential to the beauty and harmony of the ſtructure, and by elevating the broad and cumb'rous baſis into the air. It is not ſurprizing that the reſult of ſo wild an experiment ſhould be the converſion of the once noble fabrick into a maſs of ruins, and that every attempt to again erect the building upon the ſame unnatural principle of inverſion ſhould have totally failed. But it is truly aſtoniſhing that a diſpoſition to imitate the fatal example ſhould ſo generally prevail—it is truly aſtoniſhing that the neighbouring ſtates, which received a moſt violent concuſſion from the fall of the ancient and ſtupendous Edifice, and which are thereby themſelves expoſed to a ſimilar fate, inſtead of uniting to raiſe it again upon its original baſe, and in its former proportions, ſhould ſeem almoſt inclined to leave the horrid gap, although greatly encreaſed by the ſubſequent downfall of almoſt every *proximate* eſtabliſhment, and although viſibly tending to undermine even the moſt *remote*.

Such however is the folly contained in the propoſal of treating for peace with the *Republic*, which is but another word for the *Anarchy* of France. It is impoſſible to liſten to ſuch a propoſal, without loſing ſight of the

dictates both of recent experience and of ancient wiſdom, without renouncing every maxim of policy known to former times, and without abandoning whatever has been hitherto eſteemed of ineſtimable value, and of indiſpenſable importance. To negociate with France in her preſent ſituation would be to relinquiſh at once that Balance of Power, which our anceſtors conſidered as eſſential to the ſyſtem of Europe, and which it has been the object of ſo many wars, and the work of ſo many ages to ſettle and ſecure. If it be poſſible to divert the mind, from the ſublime ſpeculations of modern philoſophy, it may not be uſeleſs to conſider the ſubject in this light.

That principle of ambition, which is the neceſſary ſource of rivalſhip and jealouſy, and which has been planted in the human mind for the wiſeſt and kindeſt purpoſes, as a ſpring of action—as a ſtimulus to exertion—as the means of unfolding the faculties of the ſoul, and preſerving it from languor and apathy, tends like all our valuable propenſities to an extreme, injurious both to ourſelves and others, unleſs regulated and controuled by external reſtraints. The ſame exceſs to which individuals are expoſed, and which can only be checked

by the operation of ſalutary laws, is in a ſtill greater degree to be apprehended among thoſe combinations of individuals, which conſtitute ſocieties or ſtates; and *that* in proportion to the extent, power, and reſources of ſuch combinations. The cauſes of public and private contention—of litigation and of war, are thus interwoven in the conſtitution of man and inſeparable from his nature; and while we muſt laugh at the abſurdity of thoſe who indulge the vain and prepoſterous ſpeculation, that it is poſſible for wars entirely to ceaſe while the world is peopled by *men*, we muſt be reconciled to the ſyſtem eſtabliſhed by Providence, if we view it in the aggregate, and reflect that the evil, which conſidered ſeparately, humanity cannot but bewail, is a neceſſary conſequence of the active principle which impels man to all his exertions, which inſpires him with energy, and which is the ſource both of his utility and happineſs.

The cauſe which tends ſo unavoidably to the production of wars, will of courſe operate with more effect among nations in proportion as their contiguity, connection, and intercourſe furniſh grounds of general rivalſhip and jealouſy, or of particular differences and diſputes.

Even

Even the advancement of civilization and its attendant diſcoveries, which are reciprocally the cauſe and effect of a more intimate connection between ſtates, will neceſſarily open new ſources of hoſtility, and encreaſe thoſe which already exiſt. Particularly wherever a number of neighbouring ſtates, by their ſituation, intercourſe, and mutual dependence, form as it were a diſtinct ſyſtem, there the cauſes of hoſtility may be expected to be moſt frequent. In ſuch a caſe it is evident that a new danger ariſes; namely, that ſome one ſtate by the acquiſition of an undue preponderance, ſhould enable itſelf to attain a general dominion over the reſt, and thereby deſtroy their liberties and independence. To prevent ſuch a misfortune, it is neceſſary to eſtabliſh and preſerve what is called a balance of power, the object of which is to ſecure a general equilibrium, ſo that it may be impoſſible for any one ſtate to acquire too great an aſcendancy. For this purpoſe leagues and combinations are formed, as circumſtances may render them neceſſary, to keep the balance even. And without any other ground of hoſtility, neutral nations are often upon this principle of ſelf-preſervation and general ſecurity, authoriſed and impelled to interfere in quarrels, in which they had no original concern:

and

and to throw themſelves into the lighter ſcale, to ſave it from being entirely overpoiſed, or to dictate, as umpire, ſuch terms as they may think neceſſary to preſerve a due equilibrium.

Without entering into the queſtion, how far the ancients were ſenſible of the neceſſity of ſuch a balance of power—without referring to the Peloponneſian war—to many other wars carried on among the Republics of Greece—to the confederacy produced by a jealouſy of the Macedonian Power, and to various other proofs furniſhed by hiſtory, that the principle is not of modern invention—without endeavouring to account for that ſurpriſing inattention to this principle, which enabled the Romans to extend their empire, and to enſlave the world; (to which inattention, as Mr. Hume ſays*, Hiero, king of Syracuſe, formed the only exception, furniſhing thereby to Polybius an occaſion to prove, that a very accurate idea of the nature and objects of a balance of power was poſſeſſed by that hiſtorian†,) without carrying

* See Hume's Eſſays, Vol. I. p. 357.

† Polybius repreſents Hiero as conſidering the preſervation of Carthage, as neceſſary for that of his own Dominions, "leſt by its fall the remaining power ſhould be able, without "contraſt,

carrying our reſearches ſo far backwards, the hiſtory of modern Europe, and the very complex ſyſtem which combines this quarter of the globe, in the moſt intimate connection of mutual dependence, demonſtrate in the cleareſt manner, that the preſervation of a due balance of power, is of indiſpenſable neceſſity, both for the ſecurity of the general and common rights of all the States ſo connected, and of the individual independence and proſperity of each; and that common policy and prudence require a conſtant and never ceaſing attention to this object, the importance of which renders it a juſt cauſe for war, and conſtitutes a war ſo undertaken and purſued, a war of defence. This therefore may be conſidered as the vital principle of European polity, and the ſoul of union, harmony, and order, among the ſtates of which Europe is compoſed. It is the grand deſign and ſcope of the laws of nations, and the principal aim of thoſe treaties, by which the reſpective rights and intereſts of European ſtates have been regulated and ſecured.

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" contraſt, or oppoſition, to execute every purpoſe and under-
" taking;" and here, (ſays the hiſtorian) " he acted with
" great wiſdom and prudence. For it is never on any ac-
" count to be permitted, *that ſuch a force ſhould be thrown into*
" *one hand, as to incapacitate the neighbouring ſtates from defend-*
" *ing their rights againſt it.*" Lib. I. c. 83.

A very little attention to the nature of the different forms of government known to mankind, and to the effects, both internal and external, which thoſe forms have a tendency to produce, will demonſtrate that France cannot be a Republic conſiſtently with this balance of power. It is ſuggeſted by reaſon, as well as by hiſtory and experience, that nations where the Republican ſyſtem prevails, are abundantly the moſt prone to war. They are peculiarly ſubject to agitation and diſquiet, and expoſed in a remarkable degree to thoſe influences, which tend inceſſantly to produce domeſtic broils and foreign diſputes. They contain no principle which can reſtrain the workings of ambition, or the machinations of intrigue: no ſuperintending controul to limit, as in a Monarchy, the aſpiring views of individuals, or the daring projects of party; and to declare to each reſtleſs ſpirit "thus far mayeſt thou go, "but no farther." They preſent on the contrary a boundleſs horizon to the ambitious, and give a free ſcope to the moſt violent ſtruggles for aſcendancy. Such a ſtate is therefore, unavoidably, in conſtant fermentation, and the paſſions of the people, which, in a republic, are the only engines of power, are perpetually excited by the machinations of faction, the operations

rations of cabal, and the artifices of popularity. The effects produced on the diſpoſition and manners of a people by Republican principles and habits, are alſo unfavourable to tranquillity, foreign and domeſtic. The character of Republicaniſm, from the Roman Brutus, down to the Britiſh Cromwell, and from him to the more modern Robeſpierre of France, has ever been conſpicuouſly diſtinguiſhed as ſtern—moroſe—haughty—ambitious—turbulent—impatient of contradiction and controul—inſidious—malicious—hypocritical—irritable—ferocious—intolerant—greedy of power—tyrannical under the maſk and pretext of liberty—implacable—vindictive and ſanguinary.

Theſe characteriſtics are ſo congenial to a republican, that they are ever found to belong, more or leſs, to thoſe perſons, who under monarchical eſtabliſhments diſplay a bias for republican principles. The cauſes that produce ſuch internal effects are not at all likely to render a nation mild, moderate, juſt, or pacific, in its external relations. On the contrary a Republic is ever ready to engage in war on the ſlighteſt and moſt futile pretences, upon the mere impulſe of pride or paſſion, and without allowing any time for deliberation. The ſmalleſt

affront—the moſt trivial injury—nay, an imaginary inſult, will ſuffice to call forth democratic vengeance. Inſtantly is the popular fury kindled into a blaze, and nothing can reſtrain its violence. Blind and inconſiderate rage is taken for patriotiſm, and vain, nay, perhaps dangerous would be the attempt to moderate its impulſe. It is even one of the main reſources of faction to flatter the national arrogance, under an affected ſenſibility for the national honour; to promote on all occaſions an eagerneſs to appeal to the ſword; and to plunge the ſtate in the horrors of war by repreſenting its arms as invincible. Nor is this all. Republics are not more prone to engage in War, than furious, deſperate, and cruel, in its proſecution. To attain the object, be it what it may, that rouſes the paſſions; to gratify reſentment, or to bring ruin on an enemy, they are ever ready to riſk their own deſtruction. Theſe qualities of a republican form of government, which render it ſo unfavourable to the harmony and repoſe of mankind, and ſo incompatible with ſocial order and good neighbourhood, acquire additional force and malignity in proportion to the extent and population of the country, which has the misfortune to be ſo governed. Bodies of men, inveſted with power, are always violent

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in proportion to their numbers. It has indeed been a principle generally received that only very ſmall ſtates are ſuſceptible of a republican government.* But nothing can be more obvious than that the exchange in any ſtate of the monarchical for the republican ſyſtem, muſt neceſſarily produce the utmoſt confuſion at home, and be attended with a violent and dangerous convulſion abroad, to the full extent of its foreign influence. But of all the nations on the earth this remark is moſt applicable to France, which is by far the leaſt fitted for ſuch an exchange. The ardent and impetuous diſpoſition of the French people, and, it may be added, the national levity of their character, render the firm and vigorous controul of monarchical government neceſſary both for their own happineſs and the ſafety of their neighbours. The very qualities which, under *ſuch* a ſyſtem, tend to quicken their ſenſe of honour, to give a dignity to their obedience, and to furniſh their

* The Roman empire is ſometimes cited by the favourers of Republics as an exception to this rule. But thoſe perſons ſeem to forget that they include in the Roman empire thoſe immenſe acquiſitions which a ſmall republic gained as the fruits of unbounded ambition, and which it held in ſubjection, in the nature of colonies, dependent upon the Republic, but far from forming a part of it, or from being admitted to the privilege of citizenſhip.

beſt ſecurity againſt oppreſſion, render them, when left to themſelves, furious, ferocious, and ſanguinary. Releaſed from that beneficent controul, which can only be enforced by the concentration of power in the hand of a ſovereign, ſuch a people muſt, in the nature of things, ruſh

" ——— lawleſs through the void,
" Deſtroying others, by themſelves deſtroy'd."

The health of ſuch a nation conſiſts in the firm and immoveable eſtabliſhment of regal authority—its poiſon in the exerciſe of popular ſway. And no rational friend to the happineſs, or even the liberties of France, can ever wiſh to ſee its intereſts in the power of deliberative aſſemblies.

But what ſhall be ſaid of that ſyſtem of things which France has thought proper to denominate a Republic—a ſyſtem of organized anarchy and unbounded licentiouſneſs—containing no one principle of regular government—acknowledging no ſovereignty but the ſovereignty of the people, which it profeſſes to recognize in the fulleſt extent of the prepoſterous, diſorderly, and antiſocial term—renouncing all the ties of ſociety, diſowning all the obligations of morality

rality and religion, and (far from ſtopping at the ſubverſion of the monarchy) aboliſhing all the ancient inſtitutions, which might have had ſome effect in reſtraining the exceſſes of a people, releaſed from the controul of legitimate authority. Abandoned to ſo wild and infuriate a ſyſtem, France has carried the principles of internal violence, ferocity, and cruelty, and of external injuſtice, aggreſſion, and hoſtility to a pitch never before known; and ſhe has diſclaimed all pacts and engagements previouſly ſubſiſting with other ſtates, and all obligations of faith and honour with governments which ſhe choſe to call tyrannical. Availing herſelf of her immenſe reſources, of her unrivalled advantages, both for attack and defence—collecting all her force with a rage and deſperation which no regular government could employ, and deriving additional ſtrength from her maniacal fury, ſeconding her formidable arms by her ſtill more formidable and deſtructive principles, and employing her infernal arts in exciting the people of every country to inſurrection, and in ſpreading that contagion which every ſtate is ſo diſpoſed to imbibe *—by ſuch means has

* "What did the enlightened Republicans wiſh for, (ſays Briſſot in his letter to his Conſtituents,) before the 10th of Auguſt,

has this monſtrous and miſhapen Republic, in purſuit of her deſperate project of communicating her horrid condition to all Europe, baffled all the efforts and all the calculations of military ſkill, and notwithſtanding the moſt powerful confederacy ever known, and which nothing but ſo extraordinary and unprecedented a danger could have produced, brought Europe to a criſis never before experienced and never before apprehended.

Where now is that balance of power to which our anceſtors attached ſuch importance? How can that balance coexiſt with a force ſo wild and irregular, ſubject to no rule or principle, and no leſs formidable in its ſtrength and reſources than vicious in its nature, and malignant in its diſpoſition—Can ſuch a force coaleſce with the ſyſtem of Europe, or with any ſyſtem of civilized ſociety? Can it be expected to maintain relations of amity and concord with any regular government? Or is not its very exiſtence eſſentially incompatible with order, harmony, and repoſe?

If

guſt, men who wiſhed for liberty, not only for their own country but for all Europe? They believed that they could generally eſtabliſh it by exciting the governed againſt the governors, in letting the people ſee the facility and advantages of ſuch inſurrections."

If the ancient French monarchy had ſeized upon the territories acquired *in ſuch a manner* by the Republic, would not all the reſt of Europe have ſhuddered at ſuch approaches towards univerſal dominion, and, inſtead of diſgracing itſelf by talking of peace, have combined to humble a ſtate, before ſo mighty, and to put it out of its power to realize its ſchemes of aggrandizement. A much greater danger now preſents itſelf. Europe has now to fear, not the univerſal ſovereignty of the Houſe of Bourbon, but an evil of an infinitely greater magnitude, and infinitely more eaſy in its production, the univerſal extenſion of French anarchy. Let any one look upon the map of Europe, and trace the progreſs of the Republican arms in two campaigns—Let him ſee the countries over-run by the Republic and now in her poſſeſſion—Let him mark the inſidious, encroaching and inſatiable nature of French democratical ambition; which notwithſtanding the moſt ſolemn renunciation of all views of conqueſt, has added conqueſt after conqueſt to its territories, has diſcovered the Rhine to be the natural boundary of the Republic *, and could doubtleſs,

* On numberleſs occaſions this modeſt pretenſion of extending the Republic to the Rhine has been aſſerted; but Cambaceres

leſs, with equal facility, make the like diſcovery as to the Elbe or the Oder, or even demonſtrate that nature had preſcribed no bounds to the empire of theſe friends and patrons of the human race *.—Let him alſo ſurvey the ſtill more ſtupendous moral effects of the French Revolution—Let him review the operation of its principles, and conſider their infectious nature, their rapid ſpread, their deleterious effects, every where viſible, in that ſpirit of inſubordination, which has already diſplayed itſelf ſo openly, and which is hourly gaining ground—Let him, after having conſidered theſe things, lay his hand on his heart and declare as an honeſt man, not merely whether the exiſtence of France as a Republic, and particularly as ſuch a Republic, be compatible with the balance of power—but whether it be poſſible to preſerve the rights of lawful government

ceres in a report from the Committee of Public Safety, March 3, 1795, ſtated the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the two Seas to be the natural boundary of the French Republic. This ſtatement allows a conſiderable latitude for future acquiſitions, as inſtead of ſtopping at the Rhine it does not intimate how far northward the boundary is meant to be puſhed.

* Briſſot formed betimes an idea of this univerſal empire of liberty to be founded by France "Liberty," he ſays in his letter to his Conſtituents, "might eaſily have found no other boundaries than thoſe of the world."

government and the exiſtence of civilized ſociety without the entire overthrow of the ſyſtem of anarchy, which has done ſo much miſchief, of the Republic by which it is upheld, and of the Revolution by which it was produced.

But ſuppoſing that the French Republic were not that wild unruly and miſchievous thing, which it is repreſented to be, how is it poſſible to think of negociating with France while in ſo unſettled and precarious a ſtate? To entertain ſuch an idea is to ſet at defiance not only every dictate of common ſenſe but alſo every principle which has hitherto been conſidered as indiſpenſable in the production and exiſtence of treaties. It has ever been admitted as a fundamental rule, eſtabliſhed not merely by convenience or conſent, but founded in reaſon and neceſſity, and capable of no exception, that treaties can only be made by that ſovereign power, which conſtitutes the government of a country: and as they are in their nature mutual and meant to be binding on both parties, there muſt exiſt on each ſide the eſſential requiſites to render them valid and to give them effect. An authority, which has been recognized (though not very fairly) by Mr. Fox,

in a partial quotation,* is perfectly explicit on this subject.

"Public treaties can only be executed by "superior powers, by *sovereigns* who contract in "the name of the state." "The sovereign "who possesses the *full* and *absolute* authority, "has, doubtless a right to treat in the name of "the state he represents—his engagements are "binding with respect to the whole nation."

Vattel, b. xi. c. 12.

The possession of the *sovereign power* is therefore necessary to give competence to the contracting party—But can the momentary and precarious possession of *vague and undefined authority* be sufficient for the purpose? The same author has obviated all difficulty on this point, by giving a clear and precise rule, by which to judge of the competence of a power to enter into treaties.

"In the fundamental laws of each state, we "must see what is the power capable of con-"tract with validity in the name of the state."

Ibid.

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* See this unfair quotation exposed in the "Objections to the continuance of the war examined and refuted." By the author.

It is therefore the poſſeſſion of the *ſovereignty*, aſcertained and deſignated according to eſtabliſhed and *fundamental laws*, which can alone give competence to contract in the name of a ſtate. It is not indeed a matter of enquiry, by what right or title ſuch poſſeſſion was acquired; for that would imply, in the party making ſuch an enquiry, a juriſdiction incompatible with the independence of the other party. But nothing can diſpenſe with the exiſtence and exerciſe of thoſe powers, which, according to *fundamental laws*, conſtitute the ſovereignty of a ſtate, and which can alone confer the character of regular and ſettled government. Short of this what can render a treaty efficacious and obligatory, or afford any rational proſpect of its being obſerved? An uſurper in full poſſeſſion of the ſovereign power, defined as above, is competent by virtue of his poſſeſſion to make a treaty, and to bind, not only the ſtate, but even the rightful Prince himſelf, ſhould he ever reſume his authority. For a treaty is made in reſpect of the ſtate, which it obliges, and derives its efficacy by virtue of the power by which it is made, and not of the individual poſſeſſing that power; and, as has been already obſerved, the particular claim of that individual, is not cognizable by the

other party. Therefore whether it be a Tudor, or a Plantagenet, a *red or a white roſe*, the acts of the poſſeſſor are valid, both for the purpoſes of internal legiſlation, and of foreign treaty. Nay, if the Duke of Orleans, miſcreant as he was, had ſucceeded in his execrable purpoſe, and, inſtead of receiving his juſt reward, in being ſacrificed by thoſe whom he excited to rebellion, had waded through the blood of his ſovereign to the Crown of France; the defect of his title and the guilt of his uſurpation, (although they would have juſtified the exertions of loyalty in favour of the rightful prince,) would have created no incapacity in him for the performance of public acts. Thus the ſovereign *de facto* is fully competent to all purpoſes of ſovereignty. But from the neceſſity of the caſe that ſovereignty muſt exiſt ſomewhere in clear and viſible poſſeſſion, otherwiſe there is nobody with whom to contract. There muſt be a ſupreme power, eſtabliſhed in conformity to "*fundamental laws*," that is to ſay, there muſt ſubſiſt an eſtabliſhed, regular, and ſettled government, or there can be no Power "capable of contract with validity in the name of the ſtate."

Of all treaties, *that* which requires moſt care and circumſpection as to its being made by a

power competent to contract and able to give effect to its engagements, is a Treaty of PEACE. For by ſuch a treaty quit we not only that condition of armed force, by which we ſought to attain the object of the war, but even that poſture of defence, on which perhaps our very ſecurity depended, and which it may be very difficult to reſume; and we rely, not on our own vigour or vigilance, but on the good faith of the party with whom we contract, and on his ability as well as his honour to enforce his ſtipulations. It is therefore of the utmoſt importance to take care that all the circumſtances, requiſite to give effect to treaties in general, ſhould exiſt in the cleareſt manner upon the occaſion of *ſuch* a treaty; and common policy demands that we ſhould not only be cautious, but even ſcrupulous and faſtidious in that reſpect; otherwiſe we might and probably ſhould, in a ſhort time, have reaſon to repent our miſplaced confidence, and find ourſelves again in a ſtate of war, but with infinitely greater diſadvantage than when we ſuffered our blind impatience for repoſe to induce us, raſhly and unadviſedly to quit *that* ſtate. The authority already quoted is alſo clear and explicit on this point.

" The

" The ſame power who has a right of making " war, of declaring it, or directing its operations, " has naturally that of making and concluding " the treaty of peace. Theſe two powers are " connected together, and the latter naturally " follows the former." *Vattel*, b. iv. c. 2.

" The treaty of peace concluded by a lawful " power, is undoubtedly a public treaty, obli- " gatory on the whole nation.—Theſe treaties " (of peace) concern and bind whole nations, " *they are of the utmoſt importance*; *the breach of* " *them certainly rekindles the war:* reaſons which " add a new force to the obligation of keeping " our faith and punctually fulfilling our pro- " miſes." *Ibid.*

And it is equally evident that theſe " reaſons" create an additional neceſſity for caution to treat only with a power, competent to pledge the faith of the nation, and capable of enforcing the fulfilment of its promiſes.

Now, what is the condition of France, with which country we are inceſſantly urged to negociate for peace. Is there any power in that country exiſting in conformity to *fundamental laws*, any which can be denominated, ſettled and eſtabliſhed government? Is it not the groſſeſt mockery to apply the term government to any

any authority exercised in that distracted nation. The Government which for centuries directed the affairs of France, and which *was* established on *fundamental laws*, has been entirely overthrown—not a vestige of it remains except in the hearts of the people, who would be almost mad with joy to see it restored—and what has succeeded thereto but mutability, confusion, and uproar? Who will say that another government has been substituted in its place, or that there is a possibility of substituting another government, with the least chance of its being durable and permanent? Who will say that there is a power in France capable "of contract with "validity in the name of the state *?" Who will say that any engagements which can be made with that country to day, will be in force to-morrow—

* Those Governments which are disposed to negociate with the French Republic may be assisted in forming a just idea of the value of treaties formed with such a power, by adverting to the report of Brissot in the Convention on the 20th Nov. 1792, respecting the affairs of Genoa. "Doubtless," said this sage legislator, "We shall examine whether a free people can and ought to bind itself by treaties: whether they be not useless with Republics, which the same common principles ought to unite, and indecent with every government, which does not hold its power of the people; for perhaps that is the secret of your Revolution and of those which are preparing." Nor should it be forgotten that at a more recent period Tallien has acknowledged that "the "principles of the Republic with regard to foreign states are "not yet fixed."

morrow—that they will oblige the ſtate—that they will bind the party which ſhall next attain the power ſuch as it is—or even be adhered to by the party, by which they may be tranſacted, during the continuance of its frail dominion—or will any one aſſert that ſtipulations ſo made will be obligatory upon the lawful government, ſhould it reſume its rights? The Revolution has not been, like other Revolutions, a mere change of perſons, but a ſubverſion of all lawful power, of all regular authority. Leaving out of the queſtion the atrocious means by which the men with whom alone it is now open to treat have advanced themſelves to their preſent ſituation—forgetting, for a moment, if it be poſſible ſo far to controul the memory, the pernicious principles they profeſs, the deteſtable practices they purſue, and the deſtructive projects they avow, is their power ſuch as regular governments can recognize by negociation, upon any grounds of ſecurity, conſiſtency, or even of decency? What are they but the leaders of the anarchy which they produced, and which they prolong? Powers they have indeed, but only to do evil—they have power to deſtroy but not to reſtore—they have pulled down, but they cannot rebuild—good is as much out of their power as it is foreign to their inclination. A

treaty

treaty made with ſuch men might have forms indeed, but where would be its ſubſtance? Nay, they do not even pretend to the ſovereignty, for they profeſs, however their conduct may be at variance with their profeſſions, that this attribute, which can alone give a right to treat in the name of the ſtate * reſides wholly and ſolely in the people and that it is the unalienable right of that capricious and indefinite body. This is the only *fundamental law* of their ſyſtem—the ſole baſis of their authority; a baſis, which, like a quickſand, not only fails to ſupport, but ſwallows up whatever is attempted to be erected upon it. Therefore, according to their own ſhewing they are not themſelves competent to contract—and in order to make a valid treaty, we muſt negociate with the ſovereign people; or at leaſt our treaty be ratified by King Mob, or it will be as deficient in form as in ſubſtance.

But, waving ſuch objections, is there for the fleeting moment even a viſible poſſeſſion of the power, ſuch as it is, which though unable to govern France ſerves to oppreſs and ruin it. What man or ſet of men can be ſaid to have ſuch poſſeſſion. Is it Tallien or Cambaceres or Sy-

* See Vattel *ſupra*.

eyes, or Andre, Dumont, or Thibaudaut, or Boiſſy d'Anglas? or which of the contending factions can be ſaid to hold excluſively thoſe reins at which every faction is pulling? Which of the numerous branches, into which the pretended *moderates* are divided, can be ſaid to dominate, or even to poſſeſs a decided ſuperiority? The *poor* Jacobins indeed ſeem to be got under—but like the giants of ancient fable they ſhake the mountains that cover them; and though they be not able to riſe, they may ſtill convulſe the earth.—But whether the Girondiſts, the Federaliſts, or the Partizans for a Republic, *one and indiviſible*, ſhall prevail, who will pretend to decide? Since the fall of Robeſpierre no ſucceſſor has been able to eſtabliſh himſelf on the throne of that tyrant. All is diſorder, contention, and diſcord, and the ſucceſs of a party is but the ſignal of new diviſions. As to the Convention, which is held out to us as a ſolid and permanent body, that aſſembly has been made ſubſervient to all parties, and is ſure to be in the hands of any party that can acquire a momentary aſcendancy—ready to hail its triumphs, to applaud its meaſures, and to effectuate its deſigns—or it may be conſidered as the grand theatre where theſe gladiators contend for victory, and where in lieu of thoſe who are

carried

carried off the ſtage freſh combatants ariſe, in quick ſucceſſion, to diſpute, with equal obſtinacy, the anarchical palm.

But without relying merely upon our own obſervations, let us hear what theſe men ſay themſelves upon the ſubject. They do not even pretend that there is a government in France, or that there exiſts in that country, any powers but what are *proviſional and revolutionary*. This is the whole tenour of their diſcourſes—the ſum total of their jargon reſpecting the interior ſituation of the country. A few extracts may be of uſe to remind the reader of this truth, although for any other purpoſe they would be an inſult on his underſtanding.

On the 18th April, or, according to republican computation, the 19th of Germinal, Chazal ſaid "We muſt prepare to give the people a "government," Indeed it muſt be allowed to be high time. But how is this to be done? Aye, there's the rub.—The orator is not very confident on this point, for he proceeds, "make a trial," To be ſure, trials enough have not been made.—But who will promiſe that this ſhall be the laſt? He muſt be blind indeed, who does not ſee that the only trial which has a chance for ſucceſs is *that* which

their

anceſtors have found to anſwer for ſo many centuries. However, this incurable ſpeculatiſt propoſes the choice "of twenty-four members of "the convention to govern,"—that is "to unite, "by collecting, all the fractions of power," and theſe deputies ſo appointed are to have "the "power of execution placed in their hands as "conſuls of the French Republic," and to produce "the advantage of a well concentrated "government."

This propoſal, which was moſt probably cut and dried before it was brought forward, was referred to the committees upon the motion of Boiſſy d'Anglas, who obſerved with great truth that "the preſent government had not *ſtrength enough*," and that "the fear of giving too much power often prevented perſons from governing well."

In the ſitting of the next day Pelet, in a long ſpeech, gave the following ſketch of the internal ſtate of France:—"For theſe five years paſt, "the people, who deſire to be happy, have been "duped with words: for five years paſt they "have been oppreſſed and have ſeverely ſmart-"ed. Let us no longer adjourn our duty and "their rights, for ambition and crime, igno-"rance and famine will not ceaſe to ſpread "their

" their devaſtations. The erroneous ſyſtem of
" our political economy is the ſource of all our
" ſufferings. The ſcarcity of proviſions cauſes
" objections to be made againſt the form of our
" government; its principles ought, therefore,
" to be reviſed and renewed. Our manu-
" factures languiſh, and our maritime trade is
" deſtroyed; the military is our main object,
" the armies are the only conſumers. Whilſt
" our victories render us illuſtrious, and conſo-
" lidate our power abroad, diſorder ſhakes the
" very foundation of ſociety in the interior.
" Whilſt by our energy, we triumph abroad,
" and the coaleſced kings are forced to ſue for
" peace, weakneſs and want of energy have
" crept into the interior. What cauſes the
" true friend of his country to be alarmed for
" the fate of France? His fears ariſe from his
" conviction, that as long as we have no *certain*
" *ſettled government*, all our meaſures cannot
" poſſibly extirpate *that anarchy, which is inſe-*
" *parable from a proviſional ſtate of things*, and
" from laws dictated by circumſtances, which
" ultimately muſt plunge us into all the hor-
" rors of a civil war. Does the Conſtitution of
" 1793 contain any principle, powerful enough
" to guarantee to the French people the dura-
" tion of their republican exiſtence? Where is
" this principle? Where is that protecting in-
" ſtitution,

" ſtitution, which ſhelters it from the innova-
" tion of thoſe legiſlators, who are to ſuperſede
" the Convention? One ſays that *legs muſt be given*
" to this conſtitution, without which it would
" be impoſſible to put it in motion. Others talk
" of the addition of *organical laws*, in order
" to give it motion and life. The 34th article
" ſays, that at the requeſt of one fifth part of
" the citizens, extraordinary primary aſſemblies,
" ſhall be convened. But have not frequent ex-
" amples convinced us all, how eaſy it is for in-
" triguers to collect groupes of reſtleſs and tur-
" bulent people." Pelet, after having ſhewn the impropriety of ſeveral other articles, proceeded to call to recollection, by what men, under what circumſtances, with what views, and with what haſte the conſtitution of 1793, had been propoſed, framed, and adopted. He proved that " its authors had no other aim, but
" by means of this conſtitution to perpetuate
" their power." He ſaw in it every where " the
" ſeeds of oppreſſion, uſurpation, danger, and
" alarms;" and from thence read the concluſion, that "it ought to be reviſed and corrected."

Theſe are tolerably candid confeſſions reſpecting the internal ſtate of France, and prove not only that it is deſtitute of a *certain ſettled* government,

government, but that even the all ſufficient confidence of French legiſlators is at length baffled, and finds itſelf at a loſs how to eſtabliſh one—and that the conſtitution which was *laſt* framed, and which was kept in *petto*, for future uſe, was found to be *lame*, inefficient and inapplicable; while the proviſional and revolutionary ſtate of things was productive of *weakneſs* and *anarchy*, and tended to all the horrors of civil war.—The remedy propoſed by Pelet was the convening of the primary aſſemblies. And, as it coſts the convention nothing to reſolve and re-reſolve, the propoſal was decreed. It ſhould however be remembered that juſt at this criſis the Jacobins, ſtill formidable, were expected to make a violent effort in favour of ſome deputies of that party, whom the moderates wanted to get rid of, and as the nature of jacobin efforts was pretty well underſtood, the ruling party *pro tempore*, ſomewhat doubtful of the reſult, thought, perhaps, that the primary aſſemblies might, in caſe of emergency, afford them an opportunity of gliding off the ſtage, or at leaſt of extricating themſelves in ſome way or other from the difficulty. But as, by the aid of Pichegru, the conteſt terminated in their favour, and the Jacobins were completely defeated, the primary aſſemblies were no longer wanted, and we ſoon find it decreed in conven-

tional phraſe, that *there was no room to deliberate about their convocation.**

Were it neceſſary to accumulate evidence to prove a propoſition ſo obvious to all the world, and ſo fully recogniſed by the convention itſelf, that France is deſtitute of a government, it might not be amiſs to introduce Cambaceres, preſenting on the 18th of April a report from a committee of ſeven, who had been charged to preſent a plan for preparing *the organic laws*, and for putting the conſtitutional act partially and ſucceſſively into a ſtate of activity; when it was decreed that a committee of eleven members ſhould be formed to prepare the *organic laws*. By which it appears, that theſe Siſyphean legiſlators, after all their labours, are again at the bottom of the mountain preparing to roll up their conſtitutional ſtone, which doubtleſs 'ere it approaches the ſummit will revolve

* Briſſot gives a pretty juſt idea of the nature of *primary aſſemblies* convened by authority of the Republic in foreign countries, for the purpoſe of putting the people in poſſeſſion of the ineſtimable and unalienable right to chooſe their own government. Speaking of the Belgians, he ſays, "Who at this "time is unacquainted with the ſprings of this miſerable puppet ſhow? Who does not know the *primary aſſemblies*, compoſed of a preſident, of a ſecretary, and a few aſſiſtants, "whoſe day's work was paid for?"

volve back, and leave the important but endleſs taſk to be recommenced *de novo*.

On the 26th of April, Thibaudeau is found thus addreſſing the Convention—" To heal the " wounds which tyranny had inflicted on " France, the only way was to give her a go- " vernment—You have thirteen Committees, " or in other words thirteen governments, which " can neither underſtand, nor act in concert " with each other, and which check inſtead of " accelerating the progreſs of affairs. You can- " not without injury to the public cauſe ſuffer " that relaxation in the execution of the laws " which manifeſts itſelf under your very eyes. " *Every body would command and nobody would* " *obey*.—I propoſe the following decree." The firſt article of this decree was to confide the government to the Committee of Public Safety. until the organic laws of the conſtitution of 1793, ſhould be adopted. The propoſition was referred to the Committees. April 28th, on the ſubject of confiſcations, Delmas ſuggeſted the propriety of poſtponing that diſcuſſion till the queſtion on the *particular form of govern- ment* ſhould be decided. April 29th, the Sec- tion of Butte des Moulins ſuggeſted, " the " neceſſity of ſtrengthening the government, " and of preventing the diſaſters of anarchy."

The Section requeſted, " the adoption of a " firm and energetic government." The preſident replied, that " the right of petition was " ſacred, and that the citizens poſſeſſed the " undoubted right of offering their obſerva- " tion upon the *beſt form of government!*"

Fermont,—" The people are almoſt in as " much want of a government as of provi- " ſions."

But the reader is doubtleſs long ſince tired of ſuch company, which can only raiſe in his mind emotions of horror, that the intereſts of ſo many millions of people ſhould have fallen into ſuch hands. This, however, is the ſtate of a country, even according to the repreſentation of thoſe who are at the head of its affairs, with which it is propoſed to form treaties of peace, amity, and concord.

But in ſupport of the plan of preſent negociation, it is taken for granted that peace would be the means of eſtabliſhing regular government in France. What can poſſibly give riſe to ſuch a ſuppoſition, but that confuſion of ideas, which admits of no diſtinct view, either of the ultimate object or of the means of its accompliſhment, and which at the

the ſame time conceals from notice the abſurdity it involves? To repreſent pacification as the means of eſtabliſhing regular government, inſtead of conſidering ſuch eſtabliſhment as the indiſpenſable preliminary of peace, is an inverſion of cauſe and effect not to be equalled in the annals of ſophiſtry. In familiar and homely phraſe, it is placing the horſe before the cart; or, to reſort to a more original alluſion, it is about as abſurd as it would be to turn a vane, in order to give a direction to the wind. What produced the war, but the ſubverſion of Government in France? and now, forſooth, we are to truſt to the anarchy which unavoidably reſulted from that ſubverſion, for a reſtoration of the bleſſings of Peace, and for the return of ſettled Government, without which it is clear that Peace cannot continue to ſubſiſt. We are to unchain the monſter, in full confidence that he will change his nature, that he will abandon his fury, and become mild and gentle—humble and ſelf denying—and that, when convinced that war cannot ſubdue him, he will ſubdue himſelf, and lay his trophies at the feet of regular government and legitimate authority! *Riſum teneatis?*

Oh! but ſay the advocates for immediate pacification, a great and wonderful change has taken

place in France—the people are become weary of anarchy and pant for peace, order, and repoſe—their diſpoſitions ſeem to be even faſt verging towards *Royaliſm*—gentleneſs and moderation have in a great degree aſſumed the place of that ferocious and ſanguinary ſpirit, which till lately characterized the revolution—the rulers of the French nation, inſtead of ſeeking to propagate their principles to the remoteſt corners of the globe, are diſpoſed to recognize and to negociate with thoſe ſovereigns, who were a little while ſince branded as tyrants, to be depoſed and ſacrificed at the ſhrine of univerſal freedom—nay, it is even ſuggeſted that the Convention thus metamorphoſed might poſſibly conſent to negociate with this country, with that Britiſh *Carthage*, which, a few months ago, was to be entirely demoliſhed. But can there exiſt a ſtronger inducement than is contained in theſe ſtatements, to puſh the war with the utmoſt vigour? Theſe wonderful changes which have all taken place *during the war*, afford ſurely the greateſt encouragement to purſue it with increaſed alacrity!. Shall we relinquiſh a ſyſtem under which ſuch favourable, ſuch flattering ſymptoms begin to appear?—Shall we leave the malady to itſelf, free to reſume its former violence, when there is ſuch a pro-

proſpect of its being exterminated?—Shall we abandon the conflagration to its fury when it begins to abate; when it affords ſuch reaſon to hope that it may be entirely extinguiſhed.

The extreme and unutterable miſery to which the war, conducted in ſo deſperate a manner on the part of France, has reduced that country, tends naturally to bring it to its ſenſes, and the ſyſtem of comparative moderation which the preſent rulers have been obliged to adopt, for the purpoſes of the moment, and which in the preſent ſtate of embarraſſment they cannot eaſily abandon, affords an opportunity for a diſplay of the effects produced by diſtreſs on the minds of the people. The wretchedneſs of their ſituation has not only abated their zeal for proſelytiſm, and diminiſhed that ſympathetic ardour for the liberties of mankind, by which the earlier ſtages of the Revolution were diſtinguiſhed, but it has alſo weakened their attachment to thoſe principles which were the object of their enthuſiaſm, and which they ſought to render univerſal. They find that the pinchings of hunger are not a very powerful recommendation of the new ſyſtem of liberty and equality—that the Rights of Man afford but very unſubſtantial fare—that

their

their ideal ſovereignty, beſides that it ſubjects them to the worſt of tyranny, is but an indifferent ſubſtitute for bread, and that an anarchial republic, is, upon the whole, a miſerable exchange for an ancient Crown, the ſplendour of which depended on a flouriſhing commerce, a ſucceſsful agriculture, the advancement of arts and manufactures, and the welfare and propriety of the ſtate. The general war provoked by that ſyſtem of univerſal moleſtation, which was one of the diſtinguiſhing features of the Revolution, has but accelerated the natural internal effects of ſuch a Revolution, and brought its fruits to an early maturity: and, with a juſtice which marks the finger of Providence, the deſperate and unprecedented efforts made for the ſubverſion of all ſocial order in other ſtates, have redounded to the ruin of the ſtate, from whence they proceeded. It was for the benefit of mankind, that the connection between vice and miſery was eſtabliſhed. Never was that connection ſo ſtrikingly exemplified as in France—where the violation of every ſanction of morality and religion—where the diſſolution of every ſocial tie—where rebellion, regicide, and impiety—where perfidy, cruelty, and injuſtice have been ſpeedily followed by oppreſſion, famine and deſolation—by an accumulation, in

ſhort, of all the calamities which can befal a nation, while the proſpect of the future ſerves even to heighten the ſufferings of the preſent moment.

So ſevere a chaſtiſement was never before inflicted, and never before deſerved. But the leſſon is not yet compleat. It has produced regrets, but it has not yet wrought a reformation. The war affords the only ſecurity for the benefit of the example, either in reſpect of France, or of mankind. It is only by the war and the ſufferings, which muſt attend its continuance, that the monſter of anarchy can be completely ſubdued.—Relieved from that preſſure, and ſuffered to go once more at large, he would ſpeedily become as outrageous as ever. It would be madneſs to quit him until by the reſtoration of order and government, a force be eſtabliſhed which ſhall be fully competent to hold him in ſubjection, and to prevent him from again ruſhing forth, to the utter deſtruction of civil ſociety. He exhibits indeed ſome ſymptoms of comparative gentleneſs and moderation, or rather he appears with mitigated ferocity.—But what would not that credulity deſerve, which ſhould place any confidence in ſuch appearances.—His nature is unchanged

and

and unchangeable, and he is more truly dangerous under the ſpecious garb of moderation, than in the wildeſt exceſſes of fury. It is ſtill the wolf, though in ſheep's cloathing, endeavouring to deceive in order the more effectually to deſtroy.

The internal ſituation of France*—the exhauſted ſtate of its reſources—the entire deſtruction of its finances—the encreaſing ſcarcity which it hourly experiences, and which is

* That the internal ſituation of France is diſtreſſing beyond all deſcription is fully proved even by what paſſes on that ſubject in the Convention, intereſted as that aſſembly is to diſguiſe ſo unpleaſant a truth, and to repreſent the matter in the moſt favourable light.—Among the voluminous evidence of this deſcription the report of Pelet already quoted for another purpoſe, deſerves particular notice. After obſerving that the manufactures languiſh, and that the maritime trade is deſtroyed, and having alluded generally to the great ſcarcity and dearth of proviſions, he proceeds "Should it be denied that the amount of our pro-
"ductions has decreaſed, let the departments which are laid
"waſte, the blood-ſtained and deſerted fields, the numerous
"hands which war has taken from agriculture, and the ſoil
"impoveriſhed through want of cattle and manure, deny the
"aſſertion. Whilſt thus, on the one hand, the produce of
"the country is decreaſed; on the other, our wants, and the
"number of conſumers are augmented, through the loſſes and
"diſapidations incident to war; the ſum of circulating money
"is actually quadrupled, and its nature gives it an activity of
"circulation, which it is impoſſible to calculate.

The

is already ſo great as to reduce even the inhabitants of the capital to a ſlender ratio, the rapid approach of compleat famine, and the chearleſs proſpect of a ſcanty harveſt, excluding all hope of a ſupply, unleſs by the means of that open communication, which can only be attained by peace—ſuch are the circumſtances which, by rendering peace not only the univerſal wiſh, but indiſpenſable to the continuance of the preſent ſyſtem, have compelled the oppreſſors of France to abate much of their ferocity towards the people, and of their inſolence

"The laws you have enacted concerning the diviſion of "property, the grubbing up of heaths, the redeeming o "ground-rents, and the equal partition of inherited eſtates, "encroach upon the rights of property, deſtroy the paſture "grounds, diminiſh manure, and occaſion an immenſe dimi-"nution of meat, hides, tallow, wool, and in general of all "the moſt neceſſary articles; the conſequence of which is, that "the ſpecie we have left muſt be exported into foreign coun-"tries, to draw from thence thoſe commodities which our own "ſoil is unable to afford. The rapid and enormous riſe in the "price of all merchandize, and articles of conſumption, ſtrikes "the mind with amazement, and baffles all calculation. In "the courſe of a month, a day, an hour, we experience an in-"creaſe in the price of commodities, which, in a very alarming "manner, evinces the moſt immoral cupidity, a real ſcarcity, "the want of public credit, an uneaſineſs on account of our pre-"ſent ſituation, and a dread of futurity."

towards foreign powers *; and have given to the Revolution an air of gentleneſs, which appears altogether forced and unnatural. The ſucceſſors of the nephew of D'Amiens are thus obliged to

* It is worth while to obſerve the difference which has taken place in a ſhort time in the language of theſe demagogues reſpecting the ſovereigns of Europe. Among the innumerable examples that might be cited to point out the ſtriking contraſt between their former and their latter ſtyle, the following may ſuffice as a ſpecimen.

In 1793 Publicola Chauffard, one of the Commiſſioners of the Convention in the Netherlands, ſaid, "this is a war *ad in-* "*ternecionem* between the Republic and Monarchies." And in 1794 the ſame ſentiment was expreſſed by the Preſident, ſpeaking *ex Cathedra* in the Convention—"This is a war to laſt till "death between Republicans and Kings." On the 9th of April, 1795, Pelet, in the before-mentioned report, ſaid, "How "glorious is it with laurels round our heads to hold forth the "olive branch of peace. It is true, that we ourſelves ſhould "circumſcribe our conqueſts." Which of the two verſions is the true one, which is the genuine and ſincere expreſſion of the ſentiments of the republican leaders, it cannot be difficult to decide, whether the queſtion be referred to the character, conduct, and hiſtory of theſe political Proteus', or to the change of their ſituation; they having been at the former period elate with confidence, that the war would enable them to effect their antimonarchical purpoſes, and finding at preſent, that, if continued, it muſt be fatal both to their projects and themſelves: finding alſo, that their conqueſts, even thoſe on which they principally depended, are likely to prove a burthen inſtead of an advantage, as is confeſſed in reſpect of Holland, by Pelet, in the ſame report, where he ſays "Should the Republican troops continue lon-

"ger

to ſupport that character of moderation, which they aſſumed for momentary purpoſes, unfavourable as it may be to the vigour and energy which the exigency of their ſituation requires*. They tremble every inſtant, leſt the irreſiſtible impulſe of hunger ſhould call forth againſt them the popular vengeance, and they ſeek to appeaſe the fury of the famiſhed multitude, by flattering them with hopes of ſpeedy peace. They claim much credit for the peace which the daſtardlineſs, perfidy, and ſottiſh infatuation of the King of Pruſſia, have induced that mo-

 narch

" ger to occupy that country as a conqueſt, trade and commerce " would vaniſh, induſtry would be deſtroyed, and before three " months were over, Holland would become a burthen to the " Republic, and her riches would increaſe the treaſures of the " enemies of France."

* Notwithſtanding this neceſſity to continue the farce of moderation, there are evident and undeniable ſymptoms of a diſpoſition to return, as ſoon as circumſtances will permit, to that ſyſtem of terror which *is the natural ſtate of the revolution*, and which would be the immediate effect of that general peace into which they ſeek to delude the combined powers. Theſe ſymptoms have lately increaſed, and they were very ſtrongly indicated in the Conventional Sitting of the 30th of April, 1795, when it was unanimouſly decreed to put every emigrant upon his trial—and when it appeared from the general tenor of the diſcuſſion, that it was found indiſpenſably neceſſary, by means of rigour and ſeverity, to repel the alarming progreſs of that public diſpoſition in favour of royalty, which the laxity of the moderate ſyſtem had encouraged to diſplay itſelf.

narch to conclude with the Republic, and they actually derive ſtrength and conſequence from this peace, which they take care to repreſent as the prelude to other events of the like nature.

They hold forth the idea of returning peace as involving that of returning plenty *. Can farther proofs be wanting, that they conſider peace as neceſſary to themſelves and their ſyſtem? What elſe could render it their earneſt wiſh, their ſtrenuous purſuit, their avowed object? But, beſides that it is a maxim of obvious policy not to comply with the wiſhes of an adverſary, what is the peace they wiſh to obtain? Can it be believed that it is tranquillity, order, harmony, and repoſe that they have in view, or that they can ever ſuffer the world to enjoy? are ſuch bleſſings in their contemplation, or compatible with their principles, or even their exiſtence. They conſider peace, and they rightly conſider it, as the only means by which they can be extricated from their

* "The certainty of an approaching peace—yes, of an approaching peace—this is telling you enough—will change the order of things, and the citizens ſhall at length enjoy proſperity and plenty." Speech of Roux on the 8th of April, 1795, in the name of the Committee of Public Welfare.

their preſent difficulties. They ſeek it not with any view to its future exiſtence, but ſolely for the ſake of its preſent effect. It is not the fair combatant, who, though the original aggreſſor, is deſirous of terminating the conteſt in an honourable manner, but the murderous aſſaſſin, who having failed in his purpoſe, ſeeks only to eſcape the blow which threatens him with immediate deſtruction, determined to ſeize the firſt opportunity of renewing his horrid attempt.

The powers at war with France have to chooſe between a nominal and a real, between a fictitious and a ſubſtantial peace. It is impoſſible that any peace made with France, in its preſent ſtate, ſhould at the beſt be more than a ſhort reſpite, a momentary armiſtice, a deluſive repoſe from the horrors of war.—But in all probability it would be a prelude to horrors infinitely worſe. And while it ſhould afford a breathing time to anarchy, it would prove the palſy of regular government, and deprive it of all power to make another effort. It would be the triumph of the Revolution, and of the friends of revolutions throughout the world *. It would give new

* The republican rulers already repreſent their treaties of peace as triumphs which they aſcribe to their principles

new force to the miſchievous republic, and ſtrength to the party at the head of that republic, at the moment of the treaty. It would give vigour to that maſs of paper money which conſtitutes the circulating juices of anarchy; it would afford currency to French principles, which would ſpeedily inundate every country, notwithſtanding all the dykes that might be raiſed to oppoſe their progreſs; and it would open numberleſs ſluices of ſpeculation and innovation, to ſwell the deſtructive flood. It would, in ſhort, *prevent* the eſtabliſhment of ſettled government in France, and make all the appearances which at preſent ſeem to tend towards ſo deſirable an event, to vaniſh in a moment. That aſſociation which is hourly gaining

of moderation and juſtice. Thoſe treaties are indeed triumphs, but owing, not to their moderation and juſtice, but to their hypocriſy and diſſimulation. There is great danger that they may enjoy more of ſuch triumphs, for there ſeems to be a general diſpoſition to truſt to their profeſſions, and to be duped by their pretenſions to virtue and humanity. Thus the miſchief which could never have been accompliſhed under the deteſtable though undiſſembling reign of terror, may be achieved by aid of the maſk of moderation; and, notwithſtanding the relief which every mind, fraught with ſenſibility, muſt derive from the reflection that torrents of human blood no longer flow, as in the time of Robeſpierre; there is reaſon to fear that the overthrow of that atrocious monſter may eventually prove a ſevere and irreparable misfortune to humanity.

gaining ſtrength in the minds of the people, between the ideas of plenty and royalty, of the republic and famine,—an aſſociation ſo friendly to the cauſe of order, and which it behoves the combined powers to favour by all the means in their power, would be inſtantly diſſolved. Not indeed, that peace would reſtore plenty to France, or ſave it from the ravages of eventual famine. But, by affording ſome partial and temporary relief, and by exciting at the ſame time the moſt unbounded hopes, it would enable the ruling party to acquire a temporary conſiſtence, to abandon that ſyſtem of moderation, which is only a ſymptom of weakneſs *, to re-erect the guillotine, (of which the credulous returning emigrants would be the firſt victims,) and to ſubject again to the yoke of terror, a people, reduced by oppreſſion

* Nothing more can indeed be neceſſary to exhibit the falſe and deceitful nature of that pretended moderation on which ſo many perſons ſeem diſpoſed to rely, than the very different ſyſtem which is purſued at the ſame time and by the ſame party in the Weſt-Indies; where, while France affects to be all gentleneſs and humanity in Europe, ſhe purſues the moſt cruel and barbarous meaſures ever conceived by human, or even by diabolical malignity; and by offering liberty and arms to the negroes, ſhe ſtimulates them to riſe and maſſacre all the white inhabitants.

oppreſſion to ſuch a ſtate of ſervility, that nothing but extreme want can rouſe them to reſiſtance. At the ſame time republican phrenzy, exulting in ſucceſs, elate with confidence, ſtimulated by pride, and checked by no internal dread, by no external fear, would find in every remaining want but a motive of revenge, a ſtimulus to aggreſſion and hoſtility. The invariable effect produced by ſucceſs on the human mind, would operate greatly in favour of the republican ſyſtem, and would ſtifle thoſe ſparks which, every where burſting forth, prove that the holy and kindred flame of religion and royalty, though covered, is far from being extinct. The republic, recognized after ſuch a ſtruggle by the whole world, and feeling itſelf invincible, would think itſelf entitled to make the whole world contribute to its ſupport, and to become, not merely the inſolent arbiter of other ſtates, but the *emporium* of their ſpoils. The very ſprings of internal contention would be rendered more elaſtic by ſuch a peace, which would therefore conduce to promote the ſyſtem of external moleſtation; and while faction would be conſtantly engaged with faction, that domeſtic ſtrife, which is inſeparable from anarchy, would

would be prevented from burſting forth into the deciſive proceſs of civil war, by the animating projects of foreign aggrandiſement; the only poſſible balance of contentious powers in an anarchial ſtate.

" Nec vitam ſine Marte grati, quippe omnis in armis
Lucis cauſa ſita eſt, et damnatum vivere paci."

How, then, would the States, expoſed again to Gallic incurſions and depredations, (and what State would not be ſo expoſed?) lament the raſh and haſty termination of the war! How would they regret the opportunity they had thrown away of extirpating an enemy of whoſe diſpoſition and ability to injure them they had had ſuch unequivocal proofs! How would they curſe their folly in liſtening to his inſidious overtures of peace, inſtead of being encouraged thereby to make a vigorous and deciſive effort to cruſh him entirely! How would they, in ſhort, bewail the loſs of thoſe powerful means of defence and ſecurity afforded them by the war, and wiſh that ſuch means were once more within their reach! But alas! it would be then too late; the confederacy, formed for the preſervation of the ſocial union, would be no more; and ſociety, abandoned to its fate, languiſhing under the wounds already re-

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ceived, diſheartened as well as exhauſted by its recent and unfortunate ſtruggle, deſtitute of energy, incapable of co-operation, and attacked at once by every exulting foe both within and without—would be totally incapable of withſtanding another ſhock. Even this ſea girt Iſle, falſe to itſelf, and treacherous to the cauſe of humanity, would fall an eaſy prey to thoſe moral and deſtructive influences which it had confirmed and ſanctioned by its own act, and which no advantages of ſituation, no phyſical force, no excellence of conſtitution can reſiſt.*

Should

* The queſtion of peace with the Republic may be reduced to a plain and ſimple dilemma. Such a peace muſt be concluded under the idea, either that the Republic will be able to eſtabliſh itſelf, or that it will not. In the firſt caſe what will be the conſequence of the eſtabliſhment of ſuch a Republic; what its probable and natural effect on the ſyſtem of Europe? In the ſecond, what is to become of the treaty of peace when the Republic with which it is made ſhall ceaſe to exiſt? What ſort of a peace is that which is founded on the ſuppoſition, that the power with which it is concluded cannot maintain itſelf. Again, what ſecurity would there be againſt the contracting party itſelf, in the firſt inſtance? What would be the value of its guarantee, in the ſecond?

It is true indeed, that the attention of the Republic to its engagements with neutral ſtates, is ſometimes relied on as a proof that it is capable of maintaining relations of concord and amity with regular government, and that it may be truſted

for

Should any perſon think the above picture too bold an anticipation of futurity, let him conſider for a moment what poſſible ſecurity can be obtained by negociation for the continuance of peace, for one hour after the combined Powers, through a blind confidence in the promiſes of the French Republic, ſhall

 have

for the performance of its ſtipulations by treaty. But it is forgotten by thoſe who advance this argument, that the Republic is now in a ſtate of war, and of conſequent dependence on neutral nations for the very means, not only of proſecuting that war, but of procuring internal ſubſiſtence. It would therefore be ſtrange indeed if it did not conſtrain itſelf to perform its own part of thoſe engagements, from which alone it can derive ſuch neceſſary ſupplies. But on the ſuppoſition of a general peace, the neceſſity which now impels it to this appearance of juſtice and punctuality would ceaſe, and as it is impoſſible to ſay that there exiſts any principle to ſupply the place of that neceſſity, it would follow no other rule than what its own caprice, ambition, or projects of aggreſſion and ſubverſion might ſuggeſt: and ſhould occaſion ſuit, the States to which it is ſo much indebted for their neutrality, would be the firſt to experience its violence and injuſtice. Nay, during the very time that it has been ſuſtained by their raſh and impolitic amity, it has plotted the ſubverſion of their government, it has endeavoured to excite them to inſurrection, and to involve them in that "*general explosion*" which was intended "to ſwallow up all Europe." At beſt, all the advantage that they could expect from their neutrality, would be "to retard their fall." vide St. Juſt's report to the Committee of Public Safety, May 1794.

have ſheathed the ſword and ſeparated and diſbanded their forces—let him conſider how difficult it would be for thoſe powers again to erect the ſtandard of war, ſuppoſing peace to meet with a ſpeedy and ſudden interruption—let him anticipate the impediments, which, on the part of regular government, would embarraſs the proſecution of another war, ſuppoſing it poſſible to reſume once more a poſture of defence—if the difficulties attending the preſent conteſt be ſo great as to ſeem to furniſh a motive for pacification, let him ſay how it will be poſſible to reſiſt the enemy, when all the comparative advantages we now poſſeſs ſhall have been irretrievably ſacrificed, and the ſcale ſhall be turned decidedly in his favour.—And, above all, let him reflect on the ſpirit and tendency of the Revolution*, on the principles of the Republic,

* It ſurely behoves the States of Europe, connected as they are by the cloſeſt ties—derived in a great meaſure from the ſame origin—acknowledging in their common concerns the ſame public law—regulated in their internal policy by the ſame general principles, variouſly combined and modified according to their reſpective circumſtances—aſſociating together in the ſtricteſt intimacy—relieving each other's wants, and contributing to each convenience and proſperity, by commercial intercourſe, by communications in learning and ſcience, and by reciprocal exchanges of the productions of their reſpective labour and ingenuity—and finally, depending, both for their individual

public, and on the nature of that diſorganizing ſyſtem, which being once recognized by a treaty of peace, would be eſtabliſhed on a firmer baſis than ever, and left free to effect that general ſubverſion, to which it tends as invariably as the needle points to the pole:—let him remember what has been, and from thence judge what may again occur—let him recollect how ſudden the tempeſt which has menaced ſociety with total deſtruction; how great its fury, how dreadful its ravages! What dependence can be placed on the momentary ſunſhine of peace, that the ſtorm ſhall not preſently return with redoubled fury? What ſecurity can exiſt againſt its reſiſtleſs rage, until the elements of univerſal confuſion and anarchy, inſtead of being merely aſſuaged, ſhall be compreſſed within thoſe original bounds, by which they had been ſo long reſtrained, and by which alone, (as dreadful experience has proved,) they can be reſtrained from involving the world in deſolation. It is not by a vain treaty, which would only ſet them free from the checks impoſed on them by

individual preſervation and their common ſecurity on the principles of civil ſubordination, and on the influence of morality and religion; it ſurely behoves ſuch States to conſider the nature, tendency, and example of that Revolution, which it is propoſed to ſanction, by treaties of peace and amity with its inſtigators, agents, and upholders.

by the war, and which would be blown to ſhivers upon the ſlighteſt eruption of their fury, that theſe elements can be repreſſed; but only by ſubjecting them to a *force*, capable of controuling them effectually, and of preventing them from again burſting forth to the annoyance and deſtruction of mankind.

Luctantes ventos, tempeſtateſque ſonoras
Imperio *premit, ac vinclis et carcere frænat.*
——Regemque *dedit, qui fœdere certo,*
Et premere, et laxas ſciret dare juſſas habenas.

Inſtead therefore of liſtening to the ſyren ſounds of peace, which treacherouſly invite us to deſtruction, let us purſue the war with encreaſing ardour, until it may be exchanged for that ſtate of ſecurity, which is compatible with quiet and repoſe, and without which peace would be but a deceptious and evaneſcent form. Warned by a recollection of the paſt, encouraged by a ſurvey of the preſent, and impelled by a wiſe and prudent ſolicitude for the future; let us truſt to our own vigilance, and exertions, until there be in France a power, capable of reſtoring and maintaining the ties of domeſtic order and co-herence, and compatible with the ſafety and independence of other States. Peace is undoubtedly the object of every juſt war;

and it is ſo in an eminent degree on the preſent occaſion. But it is the peculiar nature of the preſent war to ſuper-induce the remarkable and unprecedented neceſſity of rendering peace practicable—before it can be attainable.—There can be no foundation for peace unleſs the arch of Government be ſolidly reconſtructed in France, and rendered firm and durable; which it can never be until compreſſed and conſolidated by the key ſtone of its ancient monarchy: No other key ſtone can be accommodated to this ancient and venerable pile, or hold the immenſe maſs together.

The re-eſtabliſhment of Government in France is, therefore, the indiſpenſable condition of peace; not a condition *ſubſequent*, as the advocates for immediate pacification ſeem to conſider it; ſuch a ſuppoſition involves the abſurdity of pretending to erect a baſeleſs edifice, leaving the foundation to the laſt; but a condition *precedent*, which muſt be effectually ſecured before the great work of peace can be begun. This therefore muſt be the primary object of the war, or it will never attain that ultimate object, which is the earneſt wiſh of every friend of humanity: this is the point in which all its plans and operations

ſhould

ſhould concentre, and which ſhould ſuperſede every other conſideration. How to direct the war with the greateſt promptitude and certainty to this important end, is the moſt important queſtion that ever engaged the attention of confederated ſtates—a queſtion, involving the fate of the preſent age and of poſterity. That queſtion has been fully diſcuſſed in thoſe "Reflections," which, with great deference and reſpect, the Author has once and again preſſed on the attention of the combined Powers. The preſent object is merely to warn thoſe Powers againſt the ſtupendous and fatal error of recognizing, by negociation, the natural and irreconcileable enemy of order, tranquillity, and legitimate Government;—to preſerve them from that *ſuicide* of Peace which, under the influence of an inconceivable infatuation, ſome of them ſeem half inclined to commit;—and to enforce the neceſſity of proſecuting, with the utmoſt vigour, *that* War with anarchy, which has hitherto proved the means of their preſervation, and which is the PALLADIUM of civilized ſociety.

CURSORY

CURSORY STRICTURES *on the* DECLARATION *addreſſed by the King of* PRUSSIA, *to his Co-eſtates of the Empire, dated Berlin, May 1, 1795.*

IF any thing had been wanting to ſtrengthen the unfavourable impreſſion which the conduct of his Majeſty the King of Pruſſia, in making a ſeparate peace with the French Republic, is calculated to excite, the Declaration which his Majeſty has addreſſed upon the occaſion to his Co-eſtates of the Empire, fully anſwers that purpoſe. This laboured juſtification, and the lame, weak, and miſerable reaſoning it contains, ſerve but to expoſe the baſeneſs of his motives, and to render his diſgrace more viſible. If his reaſons had all the weight which they claim to poſſeſs, they would be totally inapplicable on the occaſion of ſuch a war as the preſent, and they cenſure, in the ſtrongeſt manner, the part he has taken in that war. They prove, that inſtead of being actuated by a deſire of defending ſociety from the dangers by which it was menaced, he could only have in view ſome paltry and ſelfiſh object, which finding at length to be unattainable, he does not ſcruple to violate his engagements, and to abandon his allies; and he conſoles himſelf, ſhort ſighted

monarch as he is, with the idea of the comparative diſtance of his dominions from the ſeat of that wide-ſpreading miſchief, which threatens to involve mankind in total ruin. But even in relation to an ordinary war, which his Majeſty ſeems to conſider the conteſt from which he has ſeceded, how futile, frivolous, and unſatisfactory are his explanations! What an inſult on his Co-eſtates is the Declaration that he "ſees himſelf in the happy ſituation to "announce to his moſt ſerene and illuſtrious "Co-eſtates that the war had found a termi-"nation on his part—that a happy concluſion "of Peace had been ſigned and ratified, be-"tween his Majeſty and the French Republic, "which afforded again tranquillity, and un-"diſturbed welfare to the Pruſſian dominions, "and opened (as he thinks proper to ſay) to "all the States of the Empire, a beaten road "to attain in like manner the bleſſings of "peace." It muſt, indeed, be a welcome piece of intelligence to his Co-eſtates, that his Majeſty has abandoned their cauſe; and that, while *they* are ſtill expoſed to the ſtorms of war, and the inroads of French Republican armies, "tranquillity and undiſturbed welfare have been reſtored to the Pruſſian dominions." It is a remarkable mode of "opening to all the

"States

" States of the Empire, a beaten road to attain " the bleſſings of peace," to ſtipulate a ſeparate peace for himſelf, and to leave them, with ſo great a diminution of force, to do the beſt they can for themſelves.

In excuſe for his defection, his Majeſty urges his ſervices during " three bloody campaigns," and theſe ſervices he reſounds in unnumbered changes throughout the whole extent of a tedious declaration, as weak and as vapid as the exertions of which he boaſts. With great prudence, however, his Majeſty avoids any other enumeration of his great and important ſervices, than a pompous reference to the ſhare he had in the recapture of Frankfort and Mentz. He wiſely refrains from all particular notice of his ſervices in the campaign of 1792, when, having advanced almoſt to Châlons, inſtead of attacking the French army while he might have done ſo to advantage, he ſuffered himſelf to be outwitted by the crafty Dumourier and deluded into inaction, until circumſtances were ſo changed by the intervening ſickneſs of his own troops, and the augmentation of thoſe of the enemy, then become deeply entrenched, that he was glad to ſecure an unmoleſted retreat, at the price

of the delivery of the ſtrong places occupied by the allies within the French frontier. His Majeſty, however, draws a veil over theſe occurrences, whereby he ſacrificed advantages never to be regained and laid the foundation of the ſubſequent campaigns and of the misfortunes which have enſued. As to the reſt, he contents himſelf withexhibiting his great and choſen army, ſhielding Germany, and covering like an immoveable bulwark, the greateſt part of the river Rhine; but he neither condeſcends to ſtate what, in point of active operations, this army has done, nor even what it might have done, if, inſtead of tying the hands and thwarting the meaſures of his Generals, he had left them free to exerciſe their diſcretion, and to avail themſelves of their force and their opportunities; and if he had remained in his capital, ſuperintending his affairs in conjunction with the ableſt men of his kingdom, inſtead of entruſting them to the direction of a wily Italian, whoſe intrigues have probably been the cauſe of involving this monarch in diſgrace, and of dooming him to perpetual infamy*. But it is truly curious to ſee his Majeſty aſſume ſo much credit, from the circumſtance

* It is ſurpriſing that the unfortunate reſult which attended the confidence placed by the well-meaning Louis in M. Neckar, ſhould not have taught ſovereigns the danger of committing their intereſts to the diſcretion of foreigners.

ſtance of his armies being employed at a great diſtance from the Pruſſian territories, as if it would have been a comparative advantage to have had the war to ſuſtain in the heart of his own dominions. The zeal of his Majeſty in the common cauſe is rendered ſtill more conſpicuous by the offers of Subſidy, which he acknowledges to have been made to him by the Court of Great Britain, while he forgets to mention the very conſiderable ſums which he actually received in that way, and to account for the diſcontinuance of the Subſidy, after ſo large a part of it had been paid. Such explanations might poſſibly have made him appear in the character of a royal robber, who, in order to fill his coffers, entered into engagements, which, to judge from his ſubſequent conduct, he never meant to perform, and who had no ſcruple to take the money of his allies, while he defeated their meaſures, counteracted their operations, and ruined their intereſts. The Court of Great Britain certainly afforded the moſt unequivocal proof of an ardent deſire to ſerve the cauſe, by endeavouring to ſecure at an immenſe expence the *valuable* exertions of the King of Pruſſia, (exertions, which had they been really obtained, would have been worth almoſt any price), and that Court could not upon any known principle of policy or intereſt,

have diſcontinued the payment of the ſubſidy, and thereby have enſured the entire loſs of the great ſums which had been already advanced, if there had not exiſted the ſtrongeſt proofs, that no dependence was to be placed on his Majeſty for the performance of thoſe engagements, which formed the condition of the ſubſidiary treaty.

But at what period, and in what ſituation of affairs does his Majeſty repreſent himſelf, as withdrawing from the Coalition?—When "by "the defection of the Netherlands, the maſs of "the forces which have to combat the enemy "of the Empire has been ſo conſiderably leſ-"ſened, and when the weakeſt part of Ger-"many has been opened to the enemy to force "his way into the heart of it?" then it is, that he abandons the cauſe, and leaves his allies to their own means of defence. At ſuch a criſis it is, that he not only deprives his confederates of the armies which "had ſhielded Germany," and which "had covered during three cam-"paigns, like an immoveable bulwark, the "river Rhine;" but alſo engages to furniſh an army of obſervation *to make his neutrality reſpected*. A ſtrong proof, this, of his readineſs and diſpoſition, to turn his arms againſt thoſe whom he has ſo perfidiouſly deſerted.

Suppoſing

Supposing, indeed, that the exhausted state of his own resources, and the inability of the other powers to furnish him with pecuniary supplies, had disabled him from continuing to prosecute the war with that *astonishing vigour*, which had hitherto marked his efforts, where existed the necessity of formally renouncing the contest, and of abandoning the cause? Where existed the necessity of recognizing the Republic, of giving it a vast accession of strength and consequence, by allowing it to make peace with a principal power, one of the first engaged in the war, and even by engaging to furnish it with a large supply of corn, which is the article it most wants to enable it to continue the war, and to support the Revolution?—an engagement which he has endeavoured to make good by laying a felonious hand upon cargoes freighted for Great Britain.

The only solution of all these difficulties is to be found in the confidence which his Majesty expresses in "the moderate and equitable sen-"timents and principles of the French Repu-"blic." By what newly acquired sympathy his Majesty has been enabled to discover the moderation and equity of French Republican regicides, atheists, and anarchists, is a question fertile

fertile of conjecture. But it is impoſſible to forget that theſe men, whoſe ſentiments and principles are, in 1795, ſo moderate and equitable, have committed, in the fulleſt extent, the atrocious deed, againſt which, in 1792, the Pruſſian monarch (then affecting to be the generous and ſpirited defender of fallen majeſty,) denounced, by the channel of his General, the Duke of Brunſwick, his ſevereſt vengeance; threatening to puniſh the leaſt ſtep towards its perpetration, by giving up the guilty city of Paris to military execution, and by expoſing it to total deſtruction *.

His

* See the Manifeſto of the Duke of Brunſwick, dated July 25, 1792, which, in caſe of any invaſion of the King's inviolability, makes the Members of the National Aſſembly and all others whom it may concern, reſponſible with their heads for all events; and which threatens, in caſe the Palace of the Thuilleries ſhould be inſulted, or the leaſt violence offered to the perſons of their Majeſties, or of any of the royal family, to inflict on all who ſhould deſerve it, the moſt exemplary puniſhment, by giving up the city of Paris to military execution, and expoſing it to total deſtruction. It is but juſt here to obſerve that, at the moment the Emperor's Aunt, the unfortunate Queen of France, was brought to the ſcaffold, his Imperial Majeſty had in his power, the execrable Drouet, that eternally infamous Poſt-maſter of St. Menehould, who, by ſtopping the King and Queen in their flight, became, in the moſt aggravated ſenſe of the word, their executioner. And yet the wretch (who ſhould have been made an example to all traitors as ſoon as he was apprehended) inſtead of being led to inſtant execution when

His Majeſty ſeems, however, eaſily to imbibe the ſentiments and principles, which he ſo much admires in his new allies, and to lend himſelf to that ſyſtem of diſorganization, which it is their grand object to promote. He not only deprives the Germanic body of the ſupport, which, by every conſideration of honour, juſtice, ſound policy and poſitive engagement, he was bound to afford it; but he even renders the perfidious act, by which he deſerts that body, a direct attack upon its Conſtitution. Under the ſpecious pretext of proffered mediation, he ſeeks to break to pieces that union, which is the fundamental principle of the empire—which binds its numerous parts to act in concert, both in making war and peace and in all matter of common concern—and which is more neceſſary than ever to withſtand the enemy who has injured them ſo much, and who ſeeks their total deſtruction. He invites the German States ſeparately to make propoſals of peace to the Republic with which they are at war, and he thereby ſtimulates them to violate, like himſelf, the fundamental

when the horrid event above mentioned was known, is alive at this day, a reproach to *that* want of ſpirit, energy and deciſion, which has cauſed the misfortunes of the War, and which threatens to involve ſociety in perdition.

mental principles of their Conſtitution; according to which it is well known, that when, by a regular *concluſum* of the Diet, they are engaged in war, they cannot conclude peace without the intervention of the ſame forms.* His Majeſty alſo violates his duty, by declaring that he ſhall neither furniſh the contingents, nor the uſual ſupplies of Roman months, which, notwithſtanding his peace as King of Pruſſia, he is bound by the Conſtitution to furniſh, in the character of Prince of the Empire. In refuſing to contribute theſe ſupplies, and indeed in pretending to make ſeparate peace as Elector of Brandenburg, he is guilty of a breach of his allegiance, he becomes a rebel, he breaks his oath and the conditions on which he holds his dependent territories, and he ſubjects himſelf to the Ban of the Empire—a puniſhment which it is to be hoped there will be ſenſe and energy enough to inflict upon him. He not only acts in this undutiful manner himſelf, but endeavours to ſtimulate the other ſtates to follow his example, and thereby he ſeeks to ſow diviſion and diſcord throughout the Empire, and to overthrow its

* By the Conſtitution of the Germanic Empire, as regulated by the treaty of Weſtphalia, the conſent of the Electors, Princes, and States, is neceſſary in order either to declare war or to make peace.

its Conſtitution. His Majeſty thus not only abets, but adopts in his own conduct, the Jacobin ſyſtem of ſubverſion: but it was reſerved for him to exhibit the moſt odious and diſguſting of all ſpectacles—that of *enthroned* Jacobiniſm. It is not ſurpriſing that a Prince capable of ſuch a conduct ſhould court the alliance of the French Republic. The maxim *noſcitur è ſociis* may now be applied to him in his new character of friend and ally to that congenial body.—At the ſame time he enables the world to account for the tardy, languiſhing, and inefficient manner in which he carried on the war, for it is fair to preſume that he was never hearty in a conteſt with an adverſary, of whom he was much fitter to be the friend than the enemy. Surely the States of the Empire, inſtead of being ſeduced by ſuch an example, will view it with the horror and deteſtation it ought to excite.—Surely they will combine to enforce their laws againſt a perjured Royal Rebel, and to inflict on him the puniſhment due to his perfidy and treaſon.—Otherwiſe they may expect to become a prey to the Jacobin arts of this northern Dey,—this friend, ally, and coadjutor of the all diſorganizing Republic.

FINIS.

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